




















Many countries consider the residential concentration among immigrants a problem. 
This paper studies the factors influencing individual location decisions and evaluates a 
Swedish attempt to change the residential distribution of refugee immigrants in the late 
1980’s. Despite common perceptions, I find that the evidence on increased secondary 
migration after the policy shift is very weak. Since people were exogenously distributed 
over locations, the policy provides a better way to estimate the effects of regional factors 
on relocation decisions. The results suggest that immigrants are attracted to regions 
with large populations, high representation from the own country, and large overall 
immigrant populations. Overall and immigrant-specific labor market opportunities affect 
location decisions, as does the size of the local public sector. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last decades, the immigrant population has increased in Sweden as well as in 
many other western countries. Combined with declining performance of new immigrants 
in the labor market, this has raised public interest in a number of issues concerning 
immigrants and immigration policies. These include the residential location of 
immigrants, and the pattern of so-called secondary migration, i.e., relocations within the 
host country. 
A common international experience is that immigrants are more concentrated to large 
cities than the native population. In 1997, 53 percent of the Swedish immigrant 
population lived in one of the country’s three largest cities; for natives this figure was 35 
percent. Similarly, in 1990 California, New York, Florida, and Texas hosted 63 percent of 
the foreign-born US population (Zavodny, 1997), but only 31 percent of the overall 
population. 
In the policy discussion, critics blame residential concentration and segregation for 
hampering the assimilation process of immigrants by slowing down the acquisition of 
country-specific human capital, such as language skills. In addition to this, regions and 
cities receiving large proportions of the immigrant inflow often consider this a financial 
and social burden. Until the mid 1980s, the arrival of new immigrants directly reinforced 
the concentration of immigrants to large cities in Sweden. This imbalance between a few 
big-city regions and the rest of the country was one reason behind the government’s 
decision to transfer the responsibility for immigration issues to the Swedish Immigration 
Board in 1985. A new system, later called the “Whole of Sweden strategy”, for reception 
of refugee immigrants was introduced. In the new system, people were distributed over a 
large number of municipalities, many of which previously had very small immigrant 
populations. The policy had two main aims: a more widespread distribution of the 
immigrant population, and improved conditions for assimilation. 
A crucial criterion for the success of the first objective was that people stayed in their 
assigned locality. Those criticizing the policy implemented from 1985 claim that not 
allowing people to choose for themselves will lead to higher secondary migration rates, 
which will undo some of the intended results of the policy. Even though this particular 
system is no longer in place, active placement policies remain on the political agenda.  
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The UK is currently implementing a new system where refugee immigrants are located 
away from the London region and southeast England where most previous asylum 
seekers stay. Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands also have policies designed to 
affect where new immigrants reside; see Dutch Refugee Council (1999). In Sweden, the 
National Integration Office considers new ways to make it attractive for new immigrants 
to settle out of the Stockholm area.1  Also, it is an explicit governmental goal to minimize 
the secondary relocations of refugee immigrants (The Committee on Immigration Policy, 
1996, p. 211). To achieve long-run success in all of these cases, a better understanding of 
the factors influencing secondary migration and location choice is necessary. 
This paper has two objectives. First, I evaluate the settlement policy by comparing the 
migratory behavior of immigrant cohorts arriving under the new regime with that of 
previous immigrants and natives. Second, I examine in what way regional factors affect 
people’s decisions to leave a place of residence, and what characterizes their choice of 
destination. For reasons further discussed below, the policy can be seen as a natural 
experiment. Thus, it provides a better way to estimate the influence of regional variables 
on migration. 
Several Swedish studies document various aspects of the “Whole of Sweden strategy” 
(Andersson, 1993, 1996, 1998; Borgegård et al., 1998; The Committee on Immigration 
Policy, 1996; The Immigration Board, 1997, 1998). A general conclusion is that the 
implementation of the policy increased the dispersion of immigrants in Sweden. 
However, some regions, especially sparsely populated parts of northern Sweden, have 
experienced very high out-migration among immigrants. Andersson (1998) notes that 
migration rates among immigrants were high also before the new policy was 
implemented, which is consistent with Ekberg (1995) who found higher migration rates 
among immigrants arriving before 1970 than among natives. The Immigration Board 
(1997) finds that about 40 percent of refugee immigrants leave their initial location 
within 5–6 years, and that the flows go from small and mid-sized municipalities to larger 
ones. They cite Tunevall (1994), who states that the most common factor in relocating 
and choosing a destination is family relations and a desire to live in a municipality with 
                                                 
1 See http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/newsid_699000/699841.stm for information on the UK policy 
and http://www.integrationsverket.se/pressmeddelande/pressbostad.html for a press release (in Swedish) 
from the Swedish National Integration Office (both sites accessed May 23, 2000).  
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people from the “own group”. Rooth (1998) finds that the factors most influential on the 
decision to relocate are the initial location in Sweden (metropolitan – lower probability, 
northern Sweden – higher), and the national origin of the individual, with people from 
Somalia, Iran, and Iraq being more likely to relocate. Based on the results, he reaches 
the conclusion that the “Whole of Sweden strategy” seems to have failed. 
Among the above-mentioned investigations, Rooth’s study is the only one taking the 
same approach as this paper, by explicitly modeling individual decisions from micro 
data. Rooth does not, however, directly address whether there was a change in secondary 
migration, since he includes no comparison group. This study investigates whether the 
policy affected secondary migration by relating program participants to previous 
immigrants and natives. The importance of regional characteristics is discussed and 
descriptively analyzed in many of these studies (see e.g. The Immigration Board (1998)), 
but none of them contain a formal statistical analysis of the issue. 
Experiences from the US show that secondary migration goes in the direction of 
regions with already large immigrant populations (Belanger and Rogers, 1992). 
Summing up the US literature, Zavodny (1998) concludes that the most important factor 
determining the locational choices of new immigrants is the presence of earlier ones. 
Different studies come to different conclusions on whether labor market conditions (such 
as average wages and unemployment) affect where immigrants live. However, recent 
evidence, e.g. Borjas (1999a), more frequently indicate that labor market prospects do 
matter. Another hypothesis, presented in Borjas (1999b), is that the generosity of the 
local welfare system may affect the location choice. He supports this with evidence that 
immigrants are clustered in states with generous welfare systems, and argues that these 
states may work as “welfare magnets”. By contrast, Zavodny (1997) claims that the 
design of the welfare system shows no correlation with state immigration when the 
presence of earlier immigrants is controlled for. 
The main result from the policy evaluation in this study is that there is only weak 
evidence that the policy change increased the extent of secondary migration. Relative to 
natives, immigrants are attracted to regions with large populations. Substantial 
representation from the own country is an important factor for both the relocation 
decision and the choice of destination, and movers are drawn to places with large overall  
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immigrant populations. Labor market prospects affect the decisions. Nevertheless, 
movers go to locations where there are many welfare recipients and a large public sector, 
but there is no direct evidence on welfare seeking. 
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section two provides some institutional 
detail of the different regimes and the implementation of the new policy. Section three 
discusses the nature of secondary migration, and how we would expect it to differ 
between regimes. Section four contains the empirical investigation. After a description of 
the data obtained from the LINDA database, I evaluate the policy in terms of the 
probability to leave the first location within four years after arrival to Sweden. In the 
last parts of the section, I investigate the factors affecting the decision to relocate away 
from the initial place of residence, and the ensuing choice of destination. 
2.  The different regimes 
Before 1985, a majority of refugee immigrants to Sweden were already in the country 
when they applied for asylum. 2 The usual procedure was for asylum seekers to remain 
in the municipality where they had applied, awaiting authorities’ decisions.  Thus, it was 
the task of the municipalities to assist the immigrants in finding a place to stay, and 
many immigrants stayed on in the first location after receiving a residence permit. Most 
applications were submitted in municipalities with large populations of previous 
immigrants, and refugee immigration increased the concentration of the immigrant 
population to certain areas. 
Partly because of complaints from municipalities taking a disproportionately large 
share of immigration, a new system was implemented in the beginning of 1985.3 The 
idea was to distribute refugee immigrants over a larger number of municipalities, in 
order to get a more even distribution of the immigrant population and to facilitate 
assimilation. Smaller communities would in turn aid assimilation by making interaction 
between immigrants and natives possible. Initially, the aim was to arrange for reception 
in about 60 municipalities. However, because of rapidly increasing immigration, a much 
larger number became involved: in 1989, 277 of Sweden’s 284 municipalities had an 
                                                 
2 Refugee centers were in place for quota refugees. The annual inflow of this group of immigrants was 
roughly constant during the 1980s; thus, its share of total immigration decreased as refugee immigration 
soared. 
3 In practice, the new system came into effect during a trial period in the fall of 1984.  
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agreement with the Immigration Board to provide spots. The factors that initially were 
supposed to govern the placement – labor market and education opportunities – were to 
a large extent neglected in favor of housing availability. 
Edin et al. (2000) describe in more detail how the system developed, and how it 
worked for people immigrating under it.4 They reach three conclusions that are of 
importance for the design of this study. First, a vast majority of the refugee immigrants 
were included in the governmental placement program. Second, the placement policy 
was strictest between 1987 and 1989; during this period about 90 percent of the refugee 
immigrants were assigned to municipalities. Third, the policy was implemented in a way 
that can be interpreted as a natural experiment. The assignment of municipality 
appears to have been independent of unobservable individual characteristics, with little 
room for most people to affect their initial location. Note, though, that after initial 
placement there were no restrictions on people’s right to relocate. Leaving the assigned 
municipality only meant the loss of some activities granted in an introduction program, 
which lasted about 18 months. 
Most refugee immigrants arriving before 1985 were free to choose their initial 
location. Those arriving under the program faced severe restrictions on their possibilities 
to choose for themselves, and were normally placed by Swedish authorities. In the next 
section, I discuss what differences in migratory behavior we may expect between the two 
regimes. 
3.  Secondary migration 
This section begins with a brief discussion on the nature of secondary migration, and 
how the placement policy should be evaluated. After that, I discuss how the extent of 
secondary migration can be expected to vary between regimes. 
Evaluating secondary migration 
Criticizers of the policy attempt, as well as the government itself, assume that secondary 
migration is something negative. This is not necessarily true. For immigrants, choosing 
a place of residence in the host country may very well be a dynamic process. Initially one 
chooses a region where the opportunities for obtaining information about other localities 
                                                 
4 For an extensive description of the policy, and a survey of research related to it, see The Immigration 
Board (1997).  
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and acquiring country-specific human capital are good. Then, after gaining information 
and skills, one moves on to another place with desired characteristics. If this is the true 
process, secondary migration cannot be seen as an evaluation objective. Rather, we 
should then evaluate people’s outcomes, e.g. in terms of earnings and employment, after 
some time in Sweden. 
If we adhere to the view that the choice of location is a one-shot game, we can 
evaluate the policy with respect to its effect on secondary migration. Still, in this case we 
have to distinguish between two forms of secondary migration. The first form occurs as a 
result of changed conditions and opportunities, and cannot be avoided with the 
information available when the first choice is made. The second form is a correction of a 
suboptimal initial choice. For the purposes of this paper, the latter type of secondary 
migration is the one of primary interest. 
Expectations for secondary migration 
The policy shift can be seen as going from a system where the individual chooses both 
the initial location and whether to relocate, to one where the government makes the first 
choice, and then the individual chooses to stay or move. As claimed by Andersson (1998), 
a common view is that from a theoretical standpoint, the whole of Sweden policy must 
have increased the migration probabilities of new immigrants to Sweden. This is based 
on the simple intuition that individuals are more likely than the government to make 
the right choice of location immediately. There will therefore not be as much relocation 
to correct for suboptimal initial choices under the individual regime as under the 
governmental. 
To see the assumptions that this argument rests upon, assume that an individual’s 
utility in each possible location can be separated into two factors: (i) labor market 
outcomes and (ii) direct utility from regional amenities, e.g. presence of people from the 
own country. The above statement on secondary migration is then universally true if one 
of the following conditions hold: (i) the government has an information disadvantage 
regarding at least one factor, and does not have an information advantage regarding the 
other factor; (ii) the government has the same information but a different utility function 
than the individual.  
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It is easy to see that there may be situations when none of these conditions are met, 
and we are unable to determine which regime generates the higher rate of secondary 
migration. First, if the government and the individual have a common information set 
and the same utility function, the outcomes will be identical. Also, with perfect 
information in the first stage, there will be no correction relocations. In the case studied, 
the government clearly had an ambition to locate people where there were few previous 
immigrants. Accordingly, the government did not share the individuals’ valuation of 
regional amenities, which would lead to correction migration when people re-optimize. 
However, it is reasonable to think that the government could have an information 
advantage concerning the labor market prospects in various locations. People coming to 
a new country may have limited initial information on regional variations in 
opportunities of this kind, and then correct their location choices as they gain 
information with time. If the placement officers have, and act on, better information 
about the suitability of available choices, correction migration could be lower under the 
governmental regime than under the individual. 
The implication is that without assumptions about information differences or differing 
utility functions, we cannot determine whether a governmental regime for initial 
placement leads to higher rates of secondary migration than does an individual regime. 
Thus, the presumption made by previous analysts that the implementation of the new 
policy must have increased secondary migration is not necessarily right. 
4.  Empirical analysis 
This section starts with a description of the sampling procedure and the data used in the 
study. Then I turn to the empirical analysis of secondary migration, starting with the 
policy evaluation regarding the probability to leave the initial location within four years. 
This is followed by an examination of how individual and municipal factors affect the 
decision to leave the initial place of residence. Finally, I examine what characterizes 
people’s choices of destination, given that they relocate. 
4.1 Data 
The main data source for this study is the longitudinal database LINDA, which is 
described in Edin and Fredriksson (2000). The database contains two representative  
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samples of parts of the Swedish population: a population sample covering about 3 
percent of the total Swedish population, and an immigrant sample with approximately 
20 percent of the foreign-born population included. This study uses data from both 
samples. The database consists of a combination of income tax registers, censuses and 
the Swedish population register. Data are on individuals, but people are linked to their 
household members.5 
I use data for the immigrant cohorts of three years before the new policy was 
implemented (1981–1983), and for three years when the program was running (1987–
1989). The reason for choosing the latter period is that, as discussed earlier, the 
proportion of immigrants actively placed in municipalities by authorities was at its 
highest during these years. 1984 is excluded from the comparison group because the 
program in practice started out during the fall of that year. I also use a random sample 
of natives (Swedish-born) from LINDA for each of the included years. Data for municipal 
characteristics have been derived from a number of sources. The variables are described 
in the appendix. 
The registers contain no information on admission status for immigrants, i.e., 
whether the individual entered Sweden as a refugee is not known. To handle this I adopt 
the following procedure. As a proxy for refugee status, only immigrants from countries 
that were not members of the OECD in 1985 (with some additions and exclusions 
described in the appendix) are included in the primary sample. Refugee immigrants with 
a grown-up Swedish-born person or a previous immigrant in the household in their first 
year in Sweden are excluded from the sample. This is to exclude those who were tied to 
people already living in Sweden, and therefore would not be included in the Immigration 
Board’s placement program. I include in the estimations individuals aged 18–55 at the 
time of arrival (sample year for natives), whose municipality can be identified in both the 
year of immigration and four years later, i.e., I condition on staying in Sweden for at 
least four years. 
The properties of the sample are shown in Table A1 in the appendix. Natives and 
OECD migrants are primarily included to make a difference-in-difference analysis 
possible, and I therefore focus on differences and similarities between the two refugee 
                                                 
5 The household definition available is the one used in the tax registers. This definition of a household 
identifies cohabiting couples without common children as separate households.  
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immigrant subsamples. The fraction of female immigrants is slightly higher in the pre-
program cohort, whereas the average age at immigration is about 30 in both cohorts. The 
fraction of people married is somewhat higher in the program cohort, and the married 
constitute a larger proportion among females than males in both groups. Regarding 
education eight years after arrival (Table A2)6, the two groups are a bit unevenly 
distributed over education categories. However, if we impute years of schooling, the 
difference in means between 87/89 and 81/83 is only 0.2 years. 
The most striking difference between the groups is the change in region of origin. In 
the 81/83 cohorts, immigration from Eastern Europe makes up 37 percent of the inflow; 
in 87/89 this figure is 18 percent. The most marked increase comes from the Middle 
East, going from 23 to 46 percent of the total immigration. Most of the immigration from 
Eastern Europe to Sweden in the early 1980s came from Poland; in the later years of 
that decade, the war between Iran and Iraq generated large immigration flows from the 
Middle East. 
4.2 Policy evaluation 
As discussed above, the policy affected the initial geographic dispersion of immigrants to 
Sweden. In the pre-program cohort, 48 percent of the sample initially resided in the 
Stockholm area; for those arriving under the program, 25 percent did. The fraction going 
to the least densely populated parts of the country went from less than one percent in 
the earlier period, to more than six percent in the later. This section evaluates the policy 
with respect to the probability of leaving the initial location.  
There are three ways of evaluating the extent of secondary migration of immigrants 
arriving under the governmental placement policy, with different levels of sophistication. 
The first and least advanced way is to only study the immigrant cohorts of 87/89. This 
gives the impression of very high relocation probabilities (Table 1), and a failure of the 
policy. The second possibility is to compare the 87/89 and the 81/83 immigrant cohorts. 
The third method is to control for overall time effects and use a difference-in-difference 
approach relating the immigrant cohorts to a reference group. The problem with this 
method is that we need a control group where the time effects are the same as in our 
                                                 
6 Measures of education are not available before 1990. For the 1981 cohort, I use the 1990 census 
information on education.  
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sample of immigrants. I use two different reference groups: natives, and people who 
immigrated from OECD countries during the observation period. (Henceforth, I refer to 
refugee immigrants as immigrants, and immigrants from the OECD countries as OECD 
migrants). It is hard to have a clear prior on whether it is better to use one of these 
groups than the other. All immigrants have in common that they are new in the country, 
and have recently migrated. On the other hand, OECD migrants enter Sweden with 
different motives and under different conditions than refugee immigrants, and changes 
in overall conditions may well affect the two immigrant groups very differently. Using 
both reference groups gives a better foundation for conclusions. 
 
Table 1 : Relocation within four years, percent. 
  Immigrants  Natives  OECD migrants 
Program 87/89  37.6  13.0  26.4 
       
Pre-program 81/83  34.4  11.9  30.1 
       
Difference 87/89–81/83  3.2  1.1  –3.7 
Notes: Fraction relocating out of the initial municipality within four years after arrival. 
 
Table 1 shows the fraction of each group relocating within four years. Relocation is 
defined as living in a different municipality in year t+4 than in year t – the year of 
immigration.7 The difference in difference appears to be positive; the change among 
immigrants is larger than the change in the reference groups. Note also that relocation 
increased among natives to the program period, but decreased among OECD migrants. 
The figures presented in Table 1 ignore possible changes in migration propensities 
following changes in the composition of individual characteristics. Table A3 shows the 
extent of relocation for each region of origin. It is clear that there are substantial 
differences between groups, where Eastern Europeans seem to be the least mobile. For 
people from Africa and the Middle East, the figures are higher in the program group, but 
for those from Asia and South America, the pattern is the opposite. With the decrease 
over time in the share from Eastern Europe and the increase from the Middle East in 
mind, it seems as if there has been a shift towards more mobile groups. This underscores 
                                                 
7 Most secondary migration appears to occur relatively shortly after immigration. After eight years, 46.2 
percent of program participants had relocated, to be compared with 37.6 percent after four years. If one 
instead uses the eight-year perspective for the analysis presented in the paper, the qualitative aspects of the 
results are the same.  
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the importance of controlling for region of origin, as well as other individual 
characteristics, when comparing secondary migration under the two regimes. 
In the basic analysis, I use both the pre-post and the difference-in-difference 
approach. With each method, there are two steps in the analysis. In a first step, I 
estimate whether program participants were more or less likely than non-participants to 
relocate, given their individual characteristics. These specifications include only 
individual variables plus cohort and/or program dummies. After controlling for 
individual characteristics, the difference between program and pre-program cohorts can 
be interpreted as coming from policy-related factors; the parameter estimates tell us if 
program participants were placed and treated in a way that changed their probability of 
relocating.8 The next step in the analysis is to include regional characteristics in the 
models. In terms of policy evaluation, this answers the question of whether there was 
any change in behavior, given that immigrants were initially located in the types of 
municipalities that they were. I will return to this issue later. 














) (    (1) 
ij P  is the probability that individual i moves out of municipality j within t years. The 
linear function  ij G has the following structure in the most extensive model  
  ij im im im ij D D D T NP G e d d d a + + + + + + + + = j int i int j i Z ' ? X ' ß Z ?' X ß' * * 3 89 / 87 2 1   (2) 
where  89 / 87 T  is a dummy that equals one for all observations from the 87/89 period, 
immigrants and the control group.  im D  is a dummy for immigrants, allowing for 
different intercepts. NP (new policy)  im D T * 89 / 87 = , and is thus a dummy equal to one for 
immigrants in the 87/89 cohort, zero otherwise.  i X  is a vector of individual 
characteristics, including region of origin dummies, and  j Z  contains municipal 
variables. The contents of these vectors will be further discussed in the analysis of 
factors affecting relocation probabilities.  im D  is also used to form interaction terms to 
allow for the effects of individual and municipal variables to differ between immigrants 
                                                 
8 A necessary condition for this analysis is that unobservable individual characteristics affecting migration 
do not vary systematically between the 81/83 and the 87/89 groups of immigrants.  
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and natives or OECD migrants. For the pre-post analysis, the time variable  89 / 87 T , the 
immigrant dummy  im D , and the interaction terms are excluded. The “individual” 
estimations exclude  j Z  (and its interaction), whereas the “municipal” include both  i X  
and  j Z . In the specification above,  1 d  captures the difference-in-difference in relocation 
probability, i.e., whether there was a change in the difference between the control 
group’s and new immigrants’ migration propensities following the new policy. In the pre-
post analysis,  1 d  captures the difference in migration probability between program 
participants and previous cohorts of immigrants. 
 
Table 2 : Probability of relocating within four years, logit. 
  Individual  Individual + municipal 
Pre-post  –.008  –.317 
  (.048)  (.061) 
     
Diff-in-diff, natives  –.104  –.268 
  (.070)  (.087) 
     
Diff-in-diff, OECD migrants  .181  .033 
  (.077)  (.092) 
Notes: Logit parameter estimates on a dummy for program participation, standard errors in parentheses. 
Full results shown in Table A4. “Pre-post” contains only immigrants, “Diff-in-diff, natives“ immigrants and 
natives, “Diff-in-diff, OECD migrants“ immigrants and OECD migrants. “Individual” includes only 
individual variables, “Individual + municipal” individual and municipal. 
 
Table 2 shows the results for the program variable NP; the full estimation results are 
presented in Table A4. The pre-post estimation using individual variables shows a zero 
effect of the policy. For the difference-in-difference specifications, the results differ 
depending on which reference group we use. Including natives yields a (non-significant) 
negative estimate for the program participants,9 whereas including OECD migrants 
gives a positive estimate, suggesting a 13 percent increased relocation probability 
following the implementation of the policy. 10 
With the new policy, the government took a more active role in the reception of 
refugee immigrants. Since the Immigration Board was aware that many people were 
                                                 
9 Previous research often finds that people who have once moved are more likely to do it again. This is 
confirmed for the native sample; of those who moved within three years before the sampling year, 33 percent 
moved within four years, compared to 10 percent of those who did not move shortly before the sampling year. 
Including only previous native movers in the reference group gives an estimate for NP of –0.070 (0.173). 
10 In the logit model, the implied effects on the probability are obtained by multiplying the parameter 
estimates by P*(1–P); we get the relative change in P by multiplying with (1–P). If not explicitly stated 
otherwise, all evaluations of effects are made with the other explanatory variables at their sample means.  
  14
placed in municipalities unattractive to previous immigrants, it probably aimed some of 
its activities at making people stay in the assigned municipality. One way to address 
whether this succeeded or not is to compare the cohorts when controlling for municipal 
variables, such as population characteristics and unemployment. The results from the 
pre-post and difference-in-difference with natives estimations presented in the second 
column of Table 2 indicate that given municipality characteristics, program participants 
were significantly less likely to relocate; the order of magnitude is about a 20 percent 
lower probability. With OECD migrants as the reference group, we find that the 
inclusion of municipal variables makes the estimate small and insignificant. 
This brings two messages. First, it seems that program participants received 
something that increased their likelihood of staying, conditional on the characteristics of 
their initial place of residence.11 Second, participants were located in municipalities 
where municipal characteristics had an adverse effect on the prospects of staying, 
compared to what previous immigrants chose. This conclusion comes from the fact that 
when we include municipal characteristics, the parameter estimate for the program 
variable gets smaller.12  
I have also performed some variations to check the robustness of these results. Level 
of education is not available before 1990, and thus it cannot be measured at the time of 
arrival. It is therefore not included in the baseline specification. However, restricting the 
sample to those still in Sweden eight years after arrival and including level of education 
in the specifications do not change the qualitative pattern of the results. A second 
variation is to use year dummies instead of the  89 / 87 T  variable, and substitute the 
program participation variable with an interaction between year dummies and 
immigrant status:  im year D D * . Even though there are some differences between years, 
these estimations do not reveal that immigrants of one specific year drive the results. A 
similar variation is to reweigh the reference group, so that the composition by year 
                                                 
11 One factor that may have induced program participants to stay was the loss of introduction activities only 
granted in the assigned municipality, and the risk of having to wait for a spot in introductory language 
courses, connected with relocation. However, the results hold also in the eight-year perspective, when this 
effect should not be present, given the long time people have to relocate between the finish of the 
introduction activities (after approximately 18 months) and the time of observation. The lower relocation 
probability must therefore come from other factors contained in the placement program. 
12 This result is confirmed in a more direct estimation of municipal effects. If we use the 87/89 cohorts to 
estimate a model with dummy variables for each municipality, and then compute weighted averages of 
municipal effects, we find that program participants initially lived in municipalities where the probability of 
leaving was higher than in the municipalities chosen by the 81/83 cohorts.  
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within the 81/83 and 87/89 periods is the same within the immigrant and the reference 
group; this does not affect the results very much either.  
The measure of initial location available is not ideal; it shows where the individual 
lived on December 31 the year he or she received the residence permit. People who have 
received their permit, but remains at the refugee center may therefore be included in the 
data. This is especially likely to be the case for quota refugees, who receive their permits 
at arrival, and then stay at centers for some time.13 Since quota refugees make up a 
larger fraction in the 81/83 than in the 87/89 cohorts, the estimate of the program effect 
is potentially biased downwards; a larger fraction of the relocations in the pre-program 
cohorts could just be people leaving the refugee center.14 
One approach is to exclude observations initially living in municipalities with (quota) 
refugee centers, or people who moved out of these quickly. However, there is an obvious 
risk that this procedure eliminates the most mobile individuals from the sample. I have 
experimented with variations on this approach. As expected, they give higher estimates 
for the program effect; e.g., a pre-post comparison excluding those who left their initial 
location in a “center municipality” after only one year indicates a 7 percent significant 
increase in the relocation probability. Thus, the possibility that there was a modest 
positive effect on secondary migration cannot be ruled out. 
Municipalities were the primary geographic unit of the placement policy. Agreements 
concerning reception were reached between the Immigration Board and the 
municipalities, and these were then in charge of organizing the introduction for the 
immigrants. Leaving the initial municipality is therefore a reasonable principal measure 
for evaluating the policy. Nevertheless, there are supplementary ways. One is to look at 
the probability of long-distance relocations. If the individual moves between 
municipalities, but stays in the region he or she initially settled in, one could argue that 
the first location was right at least in some sense. Sweden contains 111 labor market 
regions (1992 classification), which are defined on the basis of observed commuting 
                                                 
13 Quota refugees on average stayed four to six months at the center before the new system was 
implemented (Ministry of Labor, 1981). 
14 Note two things: (i) The relocation measure could also understate mobility; those who move within the 
same year as they get their residence permits are not classified as movers. Figures in The Immigration 
Board (1997) suggest that about 5 percent of the refugees move within this time span. 2. If non-quota 
refugees also remain at the centers after receiving their permit, this implies a positive bias in the estimate of 
the program effect. The average time before moving to a municipality after receipt of a residence permit was 
around one month according to officials at the Immigration Board.  
  16
behavior. The size of these regions ranges from just one municipality with a few 
thousand people to the Stockholm region having a population of almost 1.8 million 
(1998), i.e., about 20 percent of the Swedish population. 
 
Table 3 : Fraction of relocations involving change of labor market region. 
  Immigrants  Natives  OECD migrants 
Program 87/89  77.7  58.2  53.0 
       
Pre-program 81/83  57.4  59.9  50.4 
Notes: Figures in the table show the percentage of moves out of the initial municipality that also meant 
leaving the initial labor market region. 
 
Table 4 : Relocation from initial local labor market region, difference-in-difference. 
  Individual  Individual + population 
Diff-in-diff, natives  .268  –.232 
  (.085)  (.090) 
     
Diff-in-diff, OECD migrants  .442  .168 
  (.094)  (.103) 
Notes: Difference-in-difference logit parameter estimates for relocation from labor market region within 
four years, standard errors in parentheses. Full estimation results in Table A5. Population specifications 
include the log of labor market population and its square. 
 
Table 3 shows the fraction of municipal relocations involving a change in labor market 
region. It is clear that program participants were more likely to leave the local labor 
market when they moved, compared with previous immigrants as well as with the 
reference groups. When we repeat the difference-in-difference regressions of Table 2 with 
only individual characteristics, but now with the dependent variable indicating a move 
out of the initial labor market region, we get an impression of a sharply increased 
probability for program participants; the results are displayed in the first column of 
Table 4. 
This is, however, somewhat misleading. If people move randomly, movers initially in 
large labor market regions will be more likely to remain in the same one even though 
they relocate. Also, which is more relevant to this example, there will be more within 
unit variation in large regions, increasing the possibility of the preferred location being 
in the same labor market region. Program participants were initially much less 
concentrated to the big city regions than the 81/83 immigrants. A person in the latter 
group who is dissatisfied with the first location will then be more likely to choose a place  
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in the same region. Some control for region size should therefore be included. The second 
column of Table 4 shows the results from a specification where the log of the labor 
market population and its square are added to the individual variables. In both 
specifications, the estimates decrease substantially. In the model with natives, it 
switches sign and becomes negative and significant; with OECD migrants it is still 
positive but becomes insignificant. The results suggest that the increased inter-regional 
migration rates mainly resulted from placement in smaller regions, not that the regions 
had other unattractive features. How much of the population effect that is mechanical, 
and how much that is a result of preferences for large regions cannot be determined. 
The results obtained here indicate that the introduction of a new system for refugee 
reception did not have a very large effect on secondary migration probabilities in terms 
of leaving the initial municipality. Substantial relocation occurred also among previous 
immigrants that were free to choose their initial location, and the basic comparison 
between the two refugee immigrant groups indicates no effect of the policy change. Also, 
the difference-in-difference approach used to eliminate overall time effects does not show 
any clear impact of the policy: we get one positive and one negative estimate depending 
on which reference group we include. 
If the government also had an ambition to make people stay in the initial labor 
market region, this part of the policy failed. Relocation out of the initial labor market 
region was substantially higher among program participants than previous immigrants, 
which was mostly a result of assignment to smaller regions. Further, it seems that 
immigrants arriving under the program were placed in municipalities with bad 
prospects for keeping them there, but the new system also appears to have included 
some components that decreased the migration probabilities of refugee immigrants.  
4.3 Factors affecting location decisions 
Results from the US identify certain local characteristics that influence immigrants’ 
migration decisions. In particular, it seems that the composition of the population 
matters, and that areas with other immigrants and people from the own country are 
attractive. American research has primarily dealt with the initial location choices of 
immigrants. The importance of different factors could differ between initial and 
subsequent choices. We could, e.g., expect the proximity of people from the own country  
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to be more crucial initially. If there are information problems in the initial stage that are 
not there when the second choice is made, the secondary choices in some sense reveal a 
more accurate picture of people’s preferences. Thus, studying secondary migration adds 
potentially important information to the research on immigrants’ location decisions. 
 
Table 5 : Municipal population characteristics, movers and stayers. 
    Population  Im/Pop  Et/Pop  Unemployment 
    Stay  Move  Stay  Move  Stay  Move  Stay  Move 
Program  t  201.8  79.8  6.5  4.5  3.8  3.2  1.5  1.7 
87/89  t+4  206.5  216.0  7.3  7.6  4.4  4.5  5.0  5.1 
                   
Pre  t  267.0  150.2  7.7  7.5  3.4  4.0  2.9  2.8 
81/83  t+4  271.8  220.5  7.4  7.6  3.8  2.5  2.1  2.0 
                   
Natives  t  117.8  129.6  4.9  5.5      1.7  1.6 
87/89  t+4  120.7  136.3  5.6  6.0      4.8  4.5 
                   
Natives  t  117.2  125.7  4.7  5.5      3.4  3.2 
81/83  t+4  118.9  144.2  4.5  5.3      2.5  2.2 
                   
OECD  t  189.8  171.4  5.5  5.6  15.0  12.0  1.6  1.5 
87/89  t+4  194.2  155.5  6.3  6.2  14.1  11.4  5.1  4.8 
                   
OECD  t  228.3  170.5  5.6  5.5  18.8  20.2  3.0  2.9 
81/83  t+4  232.3  175.1  5.6  5.4  16.8  16.8  2.3  2.0 
Notes: Averages of municipal variables at immigration and four years later for people who stay and relocate. 
“Population” in thousands, “Im/Pop” is the immigrant share (percent), “Et/Pop” the share from the ethnic 
group (per thousand), and “Unemployment” municipal unemployment (percent). The variables are defined in 
the appendix.    
 
Table 5 displays average values of municipal variables, by group and relocation 
status. The first two rows contain figures for program participants, and the second two 
those of the 81/83 cohorts. Values for natives and OECD migrants are in the lower part 
of the table. A first striking pattern is that of the population variable in the program 
group. Those who moved were in much smaller municipalities initially than those who 
stayed, but four years after arrival the figures are not very different. A similar but not as 
strong a trend is found in the pre-program cohort. So, it seems as if people leave small 
places for larger ones. 
The next two columns show immigrant shares of the population. Aside the presence of 
fellow countrymen, the overall share of the population constituted by immigrants may be 
important for the choice of staying/relocating. A high share of immigrants could reflect  
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that the community has experience in dealing with issues related to new immigrants, 
and/or an acceptance of foreign-born people leading to less risk of discrimination and 
alienation. First, program participants were located in municipalities with lower 
immigrant fractions than what the 81/83 immigrants chose. Second, participants moved 
from smaller immigrant populations to larger ones, so that the fractions are about equal 
four years later. 
The number of people from the own ethnic group, and the fraction of the municipal 
population they constitute, may be somewhat deceptive for comparisons between 
categories, since the size of this variable varies by country and region of origin. However, 
the figures in the table clearly indicate that program participants initially in places with 
few countrymen moved to municipalities where there were more of them. 
Previous research comes to different conclusions on whether other regional variables, 
such as labor market characteristics, matter for migratory behavior and location 
decisions. Plain means of municipal unemployment do not reveal that immigrants differ 
much from natives. Furthermore, values for those who move are not different from those 
who stay. The most obvious thing about unemployment is that it changed rapidly during 
the 87/89 cohorts’ first years in Sweden. In the year of arrival, the average individual 
lived in a municipality with an unemployment rate of 1.6 percent; four years later this 
figure was 5.0 percent. 
4.4 The decision to relocate 
We now turn to the formal analysis of how individual and municipal characteristics 
influence the probability to relocate. As mentioned before, if we want information on the 
regional factors triggering relocations, using data from a “free” regime may lead to 
biased estimates. I will start by discussing this bias, and then proceed to the results for 
the 87/89 cohorts. Then I discuss how big the problem with using data from the free 
regime is, by comparing the results for the 81/83 and 87/89 cohorts. 
The problem of bias 
Estimations relying on data where people choose also their initial location can suffer 
from severe bias. To see how this problem can occur, consider the following simple linear 
probability model  
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  ij i j ij Z move P e h g + + + = i X ß' ) (   (3) 
where the probability to move or stay is a function of individual characteristics,  i X , a 
municipal factor,  j Z , and an unobservable individual component  i h . If there is a 
correlation between  i h  and  j Z , estimates of g  will be biased. There are two obvious 
ways that this correlation could occur. The first one parallels the ability bias much 
studied in the schooling literature. Suppose people with high “innate” migration 
propensity initially tend to go to localities with, say, large populations. The result is that 
the estimate on population size will be positively biased. 
The second way is a result of sorting. The probability to relocate in (3) is the 
probability that the utility in another locality will exceed the utility in the current place 
of residence (plus relocation costs). If people value municipal characteristics differently, 
we have an individual  i g , and  j i i Z ) ( g g h - = . If people act on their preferences in 
location decisions, so that there is a correlation between the omitted element and the 
included  j Z , we will generally not be able to estimate g , the average effect of  j Z  on the 
relocation probability. If this is an important issue or not, can be examined with the data 
available. The natural experiment character of the placement of the 87/89 cohorts yields 
data that are free from the type of correlation discussed here,15 whereas it is a potential 
problem for both the 81/83 cohorts and the sample of natives. 
In a maximum likelihood model with a binary dependent variable, omitting a relevant 
variable ( i h ) may bias the estimates even if there is no correlation between the omitted 
variable and the included ones. Yatchew and Griliches (1985) investigate how this bias 
manifests itself in the probit model. They find that if the left-out variable is correlated 
with the included one through a linear regression, the bias that occurs can be separated 
into two parts. The first part resembles the bias in the linear model and appears only if 
there is correlation between  j Z  and  i h  (in our example); this bias is additive and can 
switch the sign of the parameter estimate. The other part, which can appear also 
without correlation, leads only to a rescaling of the estimate. Lee (1982) examines the 
conditions under which the parameter estimates of a multinomial logit model are not 
                                                 
15 This topic is further discussed in Edin et al. (2000). Some people may have been more likely than others to 
affect their first location. This was the case for highly educated individuals, who were attractive to the 
municipalities, and for non-singles for whom it was easier to find housing. None of the investigations in the 
study indicate that this is a big problem for the interpretation of the placement policy as a natural 
experiment.  
  21
biased although there is an omitted variable. He claims that if the omitted variable is 
continuous or discrete (not dichotomous), and  j Z  and  i h  are independent conditional on 
the dependent variable, there will be no bias in the estimates. 
If the conditions for no bias are not met, the problem of a rescaling bias seems hard to 
avoid since most applications on cross-sectional micro data will feature unobserved 
heterogeneity that cannot be eliminated. In any case, the bias is worse and of a different 
kind if we have correlation between the excluded variable and the omitted one. 
Another issue in the statistical modeling is how to obtain appropriate standard errors. 
Moulton (1990) shows how using aggregate explanatory variables on micro units in a 
linear regression may result in serious downward bias in the estimated standard errors 
of the regression coefficients. Stata, the software used, allows for relaxing the 
assumption of non-correlation of the disturbances within defined units. In our case, this 
means letting the data be clustered by municipality. This procedure does not change the 
parameter estimates, only their variance. It turns out that controlling for possible 
clustering changes the standard errors dramatically, decreasing the number of 
significant relations. To avoid excessive interpretations I report the clustered standard 
errors. 
Results for program participants 
Table 6 below shows estimates for program participants’ and previous immigrants’ 
probability to relocate within four years after immigration. The first column contains the 
results for a basic model for 87/89 immigrants; in the second column we find results from 
a model where an additional set of variables have been included. I start by presenting 
the basic model, and then proceed to the extended one.  
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Table 6 : Factors affecting relocation, program participants and previous immigrants. 
  Immigrants 87/89  81/83 
  Basic  Extended   
(Et/pop )*103  –.034  –.032  –.001 
  (.010)  (.010)  (.015) 
(Im/pop)*102  –.021  –.018  .004 
  (.021)  (.024)  (.021) 
ln (mun population)  –.716  –.699  –.675 
  (.134)  (.108)  (.141) 
Municipal unemployment  .162  .204  –.064 
  (.083)  (.082)  (.087) 
SA takers    .012   
    (.072)   
ln (per capita mun spending)    .193   
    (.512)   
Tax rate    –.033   
    (.034)   
SA take-up rate    –.007   
    (.007)   
Female  –.355  –.356  –.673 
  (.081)  (.081)  (.161) 
Age  –.005  –.006  .088 
  (.019)  (.019)  (.039) 
Age squared *10–2  –.025  –.025  –.153 
  (.027)  (.027)  (.059) 
Married  –.291  –.284  –.414 
  (.064)  (.064)  (.141) 
Married*female  .068  .066  .292 
  (.100)  (.099)  (.198) 
Region of origin (Eastern Europe ref.)       
Africa  .404  .396  .593 
  (.160)  (.167)  (.175) 
Middle East  .554  .542  .344 
  (.134)  (.139)  (.188) 
Asia  –.265  –.275  .357 
  (.123)  (.119)  (.212) 
South America  –.386  –.399  .325 
  (.109)  (.105)  (.210) 
# individuals  10,456  10,456  2,718 
Pseudo R-squared  .18  .18  .13 
Notes: Parameter estimates from logit specifications, robust standard errors (clustered by municipality) in 
parentheses. Municipal variables described in the appendix. Note that the estimates in the 81/83 group 
suffer from endogeneity bias; the results for the 87/89 group are more correct. 
 
For individual characteristics, we find that females are about 20 percent less likely 
than males to move. Being married decreases the relocation probability, but there is no 
interaction effect between gender and marital status. Both the linear and the quadratic  
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term in the standard age profile are insignificant, but suggest that the migration 
probability decreases somewhat as age increases. Excluding the quadratic term yields a 
significant estimate for the linear variable, with approximately 5 percentage points 
lower probability for every 10 years (in both specifications). 
The descriptive statistics discussed above suggest that region of origin explains some 
of the variation in migration propensities; this is confirmed in the estimations. People 
from Africa and the Middle East are most mobile, whereas those from Asia and South 
America appear to be less likely to move. The effects are quite sizable: the parameters 
e.g. suggest that Africans have 30 percent higher migration probability than Eastern 
Europeans, and that immigrants from the Middle East are almost twice as likely to move 
compared to South Americans.16 
The basic setup contains the three variables related to municipal population 
composition discussed in 4.3. The first population variable is the fraction of the 
municipal population made up by people from the own ethnic group, defined by country 
of birth.17 As expected, the larger this fraction, the lower the probability to leave. The 
estimates point at a 10 percent decrease in the probability following a standard 
deviation increase in the variable. This finding matches the American research in this 
field; see e.g. Bartel (1989). The second population variable – the overall share of 
immigrants in the municipality – gives results that are insignificant in the clustered 
specifications. 
Third, the log of municipal population is included. We find that the effect is negative, 
highly significant, and of sizable magnitude: the probability of leaving a municipality 
with 60,000 residents is about 15 percentage points lower than leaving one with 22,000 
people. Some of this is just a mechanical consequence of the employed definition of 
relocation; also when randomly changing place of residence, the chance that this will 
involve crossing a municipality border is higher if you start in a small locality.  
For examining whether immigrants consider labor market opportunities when 
making their location decisions, I follow the standard approach of including local 
unemployment in the model (see e.g. Bartel (1989) and Zavodny (1997, 1998)). The 
                                                 
16 Note that the estimates for Asia and South America are very different in the 81/83 cohorts. 
17 People in our sample are identified on the basis of country of birth. Population data from Statistics 
Sweden give the number of foreign citizens by nationality (see description in appendix).  
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results suggest that high unemployment may be associated with an increased probability 
of leaving the municipality. The parameter estimate implies a probability rise of about 9 
percent for each standard deviation. 
All findings for municipal variables are in line with expectations. An obvious test of 
the robustness of the results is to include regional dummies to investigate the possibility 
that the results are driven by unobserved local factors correlated with the included 
variables, and not the variables themselves. Specifications including dummies for 
counties or county-blocks18 reveal that in general, the estimates of municipal variables 
do not change much. Also, the inclusion of education eight years after arrival among the 
regressors does not change the results in any substantial way. In accordance with 
previous studies, I find that mobility increases with education.19 
Another possibility is that the specification is not flexible enough for the population 
variables. Including also the squares of the log of municipal population, the fraction of 
immigrants, and the fraction from the own country, reveals similar patterns as in the 
original specification. The most substantial difference is that the estimates suggest an 
u-shaped relation for the overall fraction of immigrants, with the lowest relocation 
probability around 10 percent foreign-born in the municipality. 
There are also alternative ways of specifying the population characteristics. One is to 
use the size of the municipal population from the own country and the overall immigrant 
population instead of the fractions they make up. The logs of these variables both enter 
the model with negative signs. If the squares of the population variables are also 
included, we get an indication of a slightly bow-shaped pattern, i.e., that the decreasing 
effect on relocation probabilities is not present at very small values of the immigrant 
population variables.20 Taken together, these alternatives for specifying the model 
confirm the qualitative aspects of the results from the original model. 
                                                 
18 This geographic grouping divides Sweden’s 24 counties (using the pre-1997 definition) into eight blocks. 
19 An important caveat, and one reason for excluding education from the basic model, is that the causality 
may be reversed here. People may move in order to study and then fall in a highly educated category. Since 
education is measured after arrival, this may be the correlation we observe. However, the pattern remains if 
the sample is restricted to people over 25 years of age at arrival, who are likely to have completed their 
studies before immigrating to Sweden. 
20 This may seem contradictory to the above result with a u-shaped pattern for the immigrant fraction. For 
two reasons, it is not necessarily so. First, the confidence interval for effects of changes in the absolute size 
in immigrant population is quite big. Second, since the correlation between the size of the immigrant 
population and the fraction of total municipal population it makes up is not perfect (0.74), the results could 
be different in the two specifications.  
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It is conceivable that the effects of local characteristics vary between groups. I have 
therefore tested specifications where the parameters are allowed to vary by region of 
origin and level of education respectively. Starting with education categories, the pattern 
is fairly similar to that found in Table 6. There is a slight suggestion that the presence of 
people from the own country is more important for people in the lower education 
categories. This is consistent with Bartel’s (1989) finding that people with higher 
education are more geographically dispersed. 
For the estimations with coefficients by region of origin, the picture gets more detailed 
and complicated (results are displayed in Table A6). The results indicate that the 
influence of local characteristics may vary by region of origin. However, the pattern of 
the differences is not quite clear-cut and it is hard to reach any conclusions based on 
these findings. 
I now turn to the results for the extended model of Table 6. Some researchers, e.g. 
Borjas (1999b), claim that immigrants respond to the generosity of the local welfare 
system in their location decisions. To examine this point in the Swedish context, I have 
included an additional set of municipality variables. The first two variables are per 
capita municipal spending and the municipal tax rate. Refugee immigrants on average 
have earnings below the mean, and would therefore benefit from living in a municipality 
with a large public sector. We would therefore expect a negative sign on the estimate for 
municipal spending, and conditional on spending, a positive effect of the tax rate. As 
shown, neither of the variables yields a significant estimate. 
The prevalence of social assistance receipt, defined as the number of households 
receiving social assistance over the size of the population, is a measure of the 
socioeconomic status of the municipality. Immigrants in our sample have a poor position 
on the labor market. Whether they are drawn to or deterred from places with low 
economic status because of this is hard to decide. On the one hand, it may be easier to 
live among people with similar economic status, but on the other, improving one’s 
economic position may be easier in a wealthier surrounding. The parameter estimate is 
insignificant. 
Conditions for reception of social assistance are a result of actual implementation of 
regulations. Ideally, we would want a measure of how the municipality treats applicants  
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in different income categories. Since this is not available, I have used two different 
variables. The first one is the take-up rate for social assistance, measured as the fraction 
of single-person households with earnings below one base amount receiving social 
assistance. The second one is the municipal social assistance norm (estimation not in 
table), which is the annual amount that a person is entitled to for costs of food and other 
household expenses (excluding housing). The municipalities determine this amount 
individually.21 The results obtained here do not indicate that people are more likely to 
remain where the take-up rate is high or the norm is generous. Finally, note that the 
results for the population variables are robust to the addition of these variables. Also, 
the inclusion of them makes the positive effect from unemployment on the relocation 
probability stronger. 
The results of this section show that the probability of relocating varies with 
individual characteristics. Region of origin seems particularly important, with some 
groups being twice as mobile as others. The municipal characteristics that have the 
statistically most robust influence in triggering relocation are the presence of people 
from the own country and the size of the population. Recent immigrants tend to leave 
small municipalities, and ones where there are few fellow countrymen. Bad labor 
markets prospects also make out-migration more likely. 
Differences in the estimates between the 81/83 and 87/89 cohorts  
We now go on to compare the estimates for the 87/89 and the 81/83 immigrant cohorts. 
The comparison between the two immigrant groups hinges on the assumption that had 
the government also placed the 81/83 cohorts the estimates would have been the same. It 
is clear from Table 6 that the estimates for the municipal variables vary substantially 
between the two regimes. 22 For the 81/83 group, the only population variable with a 
parameter of any magnitude is the log of population; neither the fraction from the own 
group, nor the overall immigrant density seem to matter. The sign of the estimates for 
                                                 
21 In short, the problems with these variables are as follows. The fraction of eligible people that applies for 
social assistance may vary between municipalities; take-up rates could therefore reflect properties of the 
population rather than strictness of regulations. The information value of the norm may not be very high if 
actual implementation deviates from formal regulations. 
22 Pooling the two immigrant groups and estimating the corresponding model (with all variables interacted 
by cohort) shows that the difference in the estimates is statistically strongest for unemployment (P = .003) 
and Et/pop (P = .065).  
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municipal unemployment is the opposite, indicating an insignificant negative correlation 
between the level of unemployment and relocation. 
This comparison is not perfect; the difference-in-difference specification in the policy 
evaluation indicate that there were overall time effects during this period, however 
different across reference groups. The problem with a similar approach here is that we 
do not have any data for natives (or OECD migrants) where we do not expect correlation 
between the error term and the included variables. Ignoring this problem and estimating 
separate models for 81/83 and 87/89, where we focus on the difference between estimates 
for immigrants and natives, we find that the qualitative differences remain. 
Interestingly, natives and the 81/83 cohorts of immigrants seem to be less likely to leave 
localities with high unemployment, whereas the opposite is the case for program 
participants. 
The conclusion is that using data from a regime where individuals choose the initial 
place of residence to study factors triggering secondary migration may cause us to 
underestimate the importance of municipal variables. This could be one reason for the 
insignificance of local characteristics found in some empirical studies (e.g. Widerstedt 
(1998)). 
4.5 The choice of destination 
The next step in the investigation is to examine where people choose to go, given that 
they have decided to relocate. In the preceding section we found that some municipal 
characteristics influenced the decision to leave the initial place of residence. With the 
same reasoning, these factors should also have an effect on the destination choices of 
movers.23 The figures presented in Table 5 in section 4.3 suggest that those who moved 
were likely to end up in places with certain population compositions. In particular, they 
seem to go to locations with large populations and substantial immigrant representation. 
To analyze the destination choices of movers, I estimate specifications of McFadden’s 
choice model for location four years after immigration. Which geographic level that is 
                                                 
23 It is intuitively appealing to think that local factors triggering relocations should have an opposite effect 
on the probability to choose a new place of residence. However, there is a caveat to this idea. Assume that 
there are two types of regions, one with high x and one with low. Suppose that most immigrants choose (or 
are assigned to) a high x initially. The factor x may then not be related to the probability of relocating, since 
almost all immigrants have similar values of it. Though, when analyzing destination choices we will want to 
include also those regions where few immigrants resided initially. If people still go to regions with high x, we 
will find that x influences the destination choice, even though it had no effect on relocation probabilities.  
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most appropriate is something of an open question. A very low level, e.g. neighborhoods, 
could be what people actually choose, but leads to computational problems. Also, the 
number of alternatives becomes so big that the model is unrealistic from a theoretical 
point of view. Large regions will have problems with within-region variation in the 
examined variables. Primarily, I use municipalities as the geographic unit, but I will use 
county and labor market region estimations to check the robustness of the results. 












  (4)  
where  ij P  is the probability that individual i chooses region  J j ,..., 1 = .  j Z  is a vector of 
regional characteristics, and since ?  is common to all regions, all individual 
characteristics cancel out of the expression. Differences in choice behavior with respect 
to individual variables are therefore investigated by estimations on subsamples. 
In this analysis, I focus on program participants; Table 7 shows results from 
conditional logit estimations of destination choices for movers within this group. The 
variables are measured at time t – the year of immigration. To interpret the results, note 
that  








   (5) 
If we are interested in the relative change in  ij P  implied by a one-unit change in  j Z , we 
need to multiply the coefficients by  ) 1 ( ij P - . Needless to say, this correction becomes 
more important the larger  ij P  (cf. the binary model above). It does not make much 
difference when we are looking at average effects, since the average probability is about 
0.004; in principle we can interpret the estimates as elasticities. 24 
                                                 
24 In the sample, 14 percent chose the municipality of Stockholm, 13 Göteborg, and 7 Malmö. Throughout, I 
discuss average effects.  
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Table 7 : Choice of municipality, program participants. 
  Basic  Extended 
(Et/pop)*103  .081  .078 
  (.004)  (.004) 
(Im/pop)*102  .094  .061 
  (.005)  (.006) 
ln (municipal population)  1.244  1.105 
  (.013)  (.027) 
Municipal unemployment  –.023  –.124 
  (.022)  (.034) 
ln (mean earnings)    .645 
    (.317) 
Immigrant employment    .020 
    (.006) 
SA takers    .134 
    (.028) 
SA take-up rate    .003 
    (.003) 
Municipal tax rate    .025 
    (.006) 
ln (per capita mun spending)    –.013 
    (.194) 
Fraction in resident-owned home    –.003 
    (.002) 
# individuals  3,928  3,928 
Pseudo R-squared  .27  .27 
Notes: Estimates from conditional logit models, 279 alternatives for each individual. Regional variables 
described in the appendix. 
 
Consider first the estimates in the basic model, where the municipal variables are the 
same as in the basic specification of Table 6. Just as we would expect, a large fraction of 
people from the own country increases the probability of choosing a particular region. 
The estimates imply that if ethnic concentration rises by 0.1 percent, the probability 
increases by about eight percent. Consistent with previous research, large overall 
immigrant populations also attract movers: if immigrant representation increases by one 
percent, the choice probability goes up by nine percent. If movers chose to distribute 
themselves in accordance with the rest of the population, the estimate for the log of 
population would be one. Here, a one-percent increase in the size of the municipal 
population raises the probability with more than one percent; thus, people in this sample 
seem to be attracted to large municipalities. The qualitative results for the population  
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variables hold also in the extended specification, but the estimates for the immigrant 
fraction and the log of population are somewhat smaller there. 
Unemployment does not yield a significant estimate in the basic model. However, the 
extended specification contains a richer parameterization of local labor market 
properties. The local labor market variations may be different for immigrants compared 
to the overall population (see e.g. Arai et al. (1999)). I have therefore calculated the 
fraction with earnings of the stock of immigrants (aged 18–64) in each municipality and 
year. I have also included the average annual earnings in the municipality.25 As we 
would expect, both of these variables enter the equation with positive signs. The 
estimates suggest that a standard deviation increase in the average earnings level gives 
an eight percent increase in the probability of choosing the municipality. Starting from 
the average level of 83 percent, ten percent higher immigrant employment leads to a 
probability increment of 16.6 percent. Furthermore, we find that with additional 
variables included, the effect of unemployment becomes significant and substantial: 
according to this estimate, a standard deviation increase in unemployment decreases the 
probability by almost fifteen percent. 
We also find that some variables that were not related to the relocation decision affect 
the choice of destination. Immigrants in our sample choose municipalities where there 
are many social assistance recipients. If the ratio of social assistance households to the 
overall population increases by one percentage point (about a standard deviation in the 
variable), we get a 13 percent higher choice probability. However, variables more directly 
related to the generosity of the local welfare system do not indicate welfare seeking: the 
take-up rate for social assistance shows no correlation with the choices made, and people 
do not appear to move to places with generous norms (estimates not shown). 
Properties of local housing markets may be of importance for the destination choice, 
since it can affect the possibility of finding accommodation.26 The fraction of people living 
in dwellings owned by themselves is not significant in this specification. The standard 
error of this point estimate is sensitive to model specification, but the size of it is quite 
robust. In alternative specifications (with variations on the included variables), the 
                                                 
25 If we instead include average earnings for immigrants in the municipality, the results are very similar. 
26 The relocation decision is likely to be less affected by this factor, since people always have a place to stay 
in the initial municipality. Including the “Fraction in own home” variable in the relocation model yields an 
insignificant estimate.  
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estimate is often significant at least at the ten-percent level. The overall average fraction 
of resident-owned homes was 68 percent in 1985; in the municipalities chosen by our 
sample, the average was 59 percent. Taken together, there is a slight suggestion that 
immigrants are more likely to go to places with substantial fractions of rentals in the 
housing market.  
The estimate for municipal spending is positive but insignificant, and, somewhat 
surprisingly, the effect of the tax rate is positive and significant. One interpretation is 
that both these variables capture the same phenomenon: a large local public sector. 
Indeed, if the local tax base was identical across municipalities, and if the government 
had to spend exactly the raised taxes in each period, the tax rate and the per capita 
public spending could not be identified separately. This hypothesis is supported by the 
fact that spending yields a significant estimate if the tax rate is excluded (and so does 
the tax rate if spending is left out). There are at least two reasons why this sample of 
immigrants might prefer substantial public sectors. First, as already mentioned, they 
are in the lower part of the income distribution, and would therefore benefit from local 
redistribution via taxes. Second, they may value certain public services that are more 
likely to be available in locations with large public sectors, such as training in the home 
language for children. 
Does location choice differ between refugees, OECD migrants and natives? Table A7 
shows estimations of the extended specification for the two latter groups. It seems that 
OECD migrants are drawn to places where there are people from their own country, but 
not necessarily a large overall immigrant population. Contrary to refugee immigrants, 
none of these groups appear to be attracted to large municipalities per se. The results for 
labor market variables among OECD migrants indicate two things. First, the strong 
impact of both earnings and overall unemployment suggest that many people in this 
group immigrate for work-related reasons. Second, the lack of influence of immigrant 
employment implies that, compared to refugee immigrants, this group in general has a 
stronger position in the labor market and need not consider immigrant-specific 
conditions to the same extent. The estimates suggest that earnings levels but not local 
unemployment affect natives.  
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OECD migrants are similar to refugee immigrants in the sense that both groups move 
to places with many social assistance recipients, and also municipalities with a high 
share of rentals (although the effect is statistically stronger for OECD migrants). 
Neither of the local public sector variables (tax rate and spending) enters significantly in 
Table A7. This is consistent with the above-mentioned explanation that refugee 
immigrants may have more to gain from public spending than others, given their overall 
weaker earnings position. 
Sensitivity analysis 
We now proceed to check the robustness of the results. First, we discuss some further 
variations on the above specifications. Second, we look at estimations where the sample 
has been divided according to gender, education level, and region of origin respectively. 
Third, we check if the results change when the unit of choice is labor market regions or 
counties instead of municipalities. 
It is possible that the results in Table 7 are influenced by factors omitted from the 
model, but correlated with the included variables. A first possibility is that people are 
more likely to move to locations close to the original one. This could either be a result of 
better information about closer alternatives, or a higher relocation cost for long-distance 
moves. I have checked this by including a measure of the distance between the initial 
municipality of residence and the choice alternative. I have also included a dummy 
variable for all alternatives that are located in the same county as the initial 
municipality. Furthermore, people may have regional preferences that are not based on 
any of the included variables. I have therefore also added county-block dummies to the 
model. Even though these variables enter significantly, indicating that people are less 
likely to move long distances and up to twice as likely to choose an alternative within 
their original county, in general, the results of the extended model above hold also under 
these variations.27 
The two first columns of Table A8 show results from gender-separated estimations. 
The influence of population composition does not seem to vary by gender: the estimates 
for the immigrant variables are quite similar. There is a small difference in the effect of 
                                                 
27 The average earnings variable looses its significance (z-value around 1.5), and unemployment becomes 
insignificant when only the distance variable is added. The effect of the tax rate is sensitive to the inclusion 
of county-block dummies.  
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population size, indicating that men are more attracted to large municipalities than are 
women. Interestingly, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the negative effect of local 
unemployment on the choice probability is strong and highly significant among females, 
but insignificant among males. The impact of immigrant earners is stronger among 
males, but the effects of social assistance prevalence and municipal tax rates hold for 
both genders. The estimates on the fraction in resident-owned homes signal that men 
drive the increased probability of going to places with high shares of rentals. 
The third and fourth columns of Table A8 present separate estimates for high and low 
educated people. The criterion for falling in the high-educated group is that the 
individual has at least some post-high school education (more than 12 years of schooling) 
eight years after immigration.28 Bartel (1989) finds that more educated immigrants in 
the US are less concentrated to certain regions, and less dependent on ethnic ties in 
their location decisions. This is not confirmed in these estimations (in contrast to the 
results for the relocation decision). The estimates for the immigrant fraction are similar 
in the two categories, and the estimates on the ethnic group variable are actually larger 
for the highly educated. 
The predictions concerning the effect of municipal unemployment across different 
education groups are not clear. On the one hand, those with more schooling may stand a 
better chance of receiving any job. On the other, unemployment is generally higher 
among less educated people. In this sample, the effects are statistically stronger for the 
low educated. Not surprisingly, we find that people with high education are the ones 
drawn to municipalities with high average earnings, and that immigrant employment is 
more important for the lesser educated. More puzzling is the fact that those with high 
education appear to go to places with many welfare recipients at least as much as do the 
lesser educated. However, finding that the low educated are more drawn to locations 
with higher shares of rentals is in line with expectations. 
In previous estimations we found region of origin to be an important predictor for 
differences in migration propensities. It is also likely that destination choices vary by 
this characteristic. Separate estimations for each region of origin group (not shown) 
reveal that there are differences but that the pattern is quite mixed and difficult to 
                                                 
28 People with missing values and those who leave the database between t+4 and t+8 fall in the lower 
education category. The results are very similar if we instead exclude these individuals from the sample.  
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interpret, which is what we found also for the relocation decision. Population variables 
have the same qualitative impact in all groups, but labor market characteristics seem to 
be more important for e.g. South Americans than for Asians or Africans. Further, people 
from the Middle East and Asia appear to be less likely to choose municipalities with 
large fractions of resident-owned homes, whereas the opposite is the case for Eastern 
Europeans. 
We now continue to the examination of alternative geographic units. Table A9 
displays parameter estimates where municipalities have been replaced with labor 
market regions or counties. It is clear that the qualitative implications are not altered. 
The estimates for the immigrant variables differ a bit from the municipality model, but 
the effect of the population size is approximately the same. Also, there is no effect of 
regional unemployment in these specifications. However, in contrast to the municipality 
models, these estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of the square of the size of the 
population. This is not surprising since the range is much wider here; e.g., while the 
smallest municipality is an own labor market with a population of about 3,500, the 
population of the largest labor market region is over 1.6 million compared to the largest 
municipality that has less than 700,000 inhabitants. With the square of the log of 
population included, both specifications yield significant estimates for the 
unemployment variable. 
The results of this section show that immigrants are likely to choose locations where 
there are people from the own country and a substantial immigrant population. They are 
also attracted to large cities. All this is well in line with previous research from other 
countries. We have also found that labor market characteristics matter. Even though the 
effect of overall unemployment is somewhat uncertain, both average earnings and 
immigrant employment rates affect decisions. Immigrants tend to move to municipalities 
with many social assistance recipients, but estimates for variables related to the 
generosity of the local welfare system do not point at direct welfare seeking. However, 
large local public sectors seem to attract immigrant movers. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
The empirical investigation of migratory behavior of refugee immigrants to Sweden 
performed in this paper has two main purposes. First, I have tried to evaluate whether  
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the municipal placement of refugee immigrants implemented in Sweden during the 
second half of the 1980s increased secondary migration. Contrary to previous results and 
common perceptions, I find that there is only weak evidence on this. Secondary 
relocations were common also among immigrants arriving before the policy was 
implemented. 
There are, though, two reservations to this result. First, because the government put 
people in small labor market regions, relocation out of these increased; if there was an 
ambition regarding a regional connection, this failed. Second, immigrants were located 
in municipalities with poor prospects for keeping them. This suggests that with the 
activities available in the new system, a more careful choice of municipalities could have 
resulted in a decrease in secondary migration. 
The second objective of the study is to identify the factors affecting relocation 
probabilities and the subsequent choice of destination. The high mobility of the 
immigrant population makes knowledge on the impact of regional factors even more 
important for policies aimed at this group. I find that using data with exogenous initial 
location is important for estimating the effects of local characteristics on relocation 
probabilities; endogenous location leads to underrating of their importance. 
Population composition plays an important role in residential decisions among the 
immigrants studied. They leave locations with small populations, and are attracted to 
large regions. The presence of people from the own country is important for both the 
decision to leave the initial location, and for choosing a new one. A large overall 
immigrant population is also attractive for movers. By and large, these findings conform 
to results from the US. 
The results for other municipal characteristics contain some optimistic messages, 
especially about the destination choices of movers. Immigrants are affected by labor 
market prospects. They leave localities with high overall unemployment, and move to 
municipalities with high immigrant employment rates and high average earnings, given 
their other characteristics. Also, there is no evidence on direct welfare seeking in terms 
of choosing municipalities with generous welfare systems; however, immigrants move to 
places with prevalent welfare receipt and large local public sectors.  
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Policies for affecting the location of new immigrants are discussed and carried out in 
Sweden and several other countries. Until today, secondary migration among refugee 
immigrants to Sweden has been high regardless of settlement policy. With better 
knowledge of the factors influencing settlement patterns and migration decisions, future 
attempts could be more successful both in achieving governmental objectives and 
increasing the utility of individual immigrants. 
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A1: Countries excluded 
The following countries that were members of the OECD in 1985 were excluded from the 
























Turkey was also a member in 1985, but was still included because of the large inflow of 
refugee immigrants from Turkey to Sweden during the observation period. 










A2: Data and tables 
 
Description of municipal variables 
   
- Population (Pop)  # people living in the geographic unit. (Source: Statistics 
Sweden.) 
- Ethnic group (Et)  # people with citizenship in the same country as the individual 
was born in within the geographic unit. (Statistics Sweden.) 
- Immigrants (Im)  # foreign citizens – Et. (Statistics Sweden.) 
- Unemployment   Mean number of unemployed / population age 16–64. (The 
National Labour Market Board (AMS).) 
- Average earnings  Average annual earnings for earners (100 SEK). (Statistics 
Sweden, ”Statistiska meddelanden, Serie Be”.) 
- Average im earnings  Average annual earnings for the stock of the foreign-born, age 
18–64, including zeros (SEK). (LINDA.) 
- Fraction im earners  Fraction of the foreign-born, 18–64, with above zero earnings. 
(LINDA.) 
- SA takers  # households receiving social assistance (annually) / Pop. 
(Statistics Sweden.)  
- SA take-up rate  Fraction of municipal population with earnings less than one 
base amount receiving SA (of those aged 18–64 in single-person 
households not receiving study allowances). (LINDA.) 
- SA norm  The annual amount that people are entitled to for coverage of 
food and other household expenses (excluding housing). Varies 
by year and municipality. (Statistics Sweden, “Statistiska 
meddelanden”.) 
- Municipal spending  Total municipal spending (1000 SEK) / Pop. (Statistics Sweden.) 
- Tax rate  Municipal tax rate (percent). (Statistics Sweden.) 
- Fraction in resident-owned  
  home 
The fraction of people in the municipality living in a house or 
apartment of which they have some type of ownership. (LINDA, 
1985 census.) 
- Municipal distances  Geographic distance between the initial municipality and the 
choice alternative (used in destination choice estimations). 
(Department of Social and Economic Geography, Uppsala 
University.)  
 




Table A1 : Sample properties. 




Natives  OECD 
migrants 
Total 
Female  .44  .48  .49  .47  .47 
  (.50)  (.50)  (.50)  (.50)  (.50) 
Age (at immigration)  30.19  29.52  35.43  29.97  32.37 
  (8.34)  (8.45)  (10.62)  (8.85)  (9.86) 
Age squared *10–2  9.81  9.43  13.68  9.78  11.45 
  (5.70)  (5.83)  (7.69)  (6.05)  (6.98) 
Married (at immigration)  .60  .54  .48  .36  .50 
  (.49)  (.50)  (.50)  (.48)  (.50) 
Married*female  .32  .30  .25  .18  .26 
  (.47)  (.46)  (.43)  (.38)  (.44) 
Nordic        .64  .12 
        (.48)  (.32) 
Western Europe        .27  .05 
        (.45)  (.22) 
Eastern Europe  .18  .37      .08 
  (.38)  (.48)      (.27) 
Africa  .12  .09      .04 
  (.32)  (.29)      (.20) 
Middle East  .46  .23      .16 
  (.50)  (.42)      (.36) 
Asia  .08  .14    .01  .04 
  (.28)  (.35)    (.09)  (.19) 
North America        .07  .01 
        (.25)  (.11) 
South America  .16  .16      .06 
  (.37)  (.37)      (.24) 
Oceania        .01  .003 
        (.12)  (.05) 
Et/pop, fraction from own 
country in mun *103  3.59  3.62    15.80  7.62 
  (4.69)  (6.21)    (3.28)  (18.75) 
Im/pop, fraction of 
immigrants in mun *102  5.78  7.65  4.90  5.53  5.50 
  (3.56)  (4.02)  (3.55)  (3.36)  (3.63) 
Ln (mun population)  11.11  11.63  10.88  11.31  11.09 
  (1.32)  (1.28)  (1.20)  (1.37)  (1.30) 
Mean municipal 
unemployment (percent)  1.59  2.85  2.50  2.01  2.16 
  (.87)  (1.38)  (1.51)  (1.42)  (1.39) 
# individuals  10,456  2,718  14,980  6,467  34,621 




Table A2 : Education eight years after immigration, percentages. 
Education  Program  Pre  Natives  OECD migrants  Total 
<9, missing  21.42  25.87  17.70  21.48  20.13 
9–10 years  18.55  10.71  12.44  16.65  14.87 
High school £2  16.70  28.87  32.52  22.21  25.69 
High school >2  18.45  13.48  11.54  13.69  14.15 
University <3  13.42  10.15  13.30  11.79  12.82 
University ‡3  11.46  10.93  12.50  14.18  12.35 
# individuals  9,963  2,671  14,795  5,741  33,170 
Notes: Percentages in each education category, measured eight years after immigration (sample year for 
natives). The 1981 cohort uses measure from 1990. 
 
 
Table A3 : Relocation by region of origin, percent. 
Region of origin    Program  Pre-program 
Eastern Europe    28.2  27.4 
       
Africa    43.7  39.2 
       
Middle East    46.6  35.2 
       
Asia    24.3  42.7 
       
South America    25.0  39.2 




Table A4 : Relocation within four years, full estimation results for Table 2. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Im cohort 87/89  –.008  –.317  –.104  –.268  .181  .033 
  (.048)  (.061)  (.070)  (.087)  (.077)  (.092) 
87/89      .096  –.049  –.189  –.350 
      (.051)  (.062)  (.060)  (.069) 
Female  –.436  –.437  .180  .187  –.144  –.122 
  (.063)  (.069)  (.060)  (.061)  (.070)  (.070) 
Age  .048  .019  –.041  –.041  –.023  –.021 
  (.016)  (.017)  (.019)  (.019)  (.023)  (.023) 
Age squared*10–2  –.100  –.057  –.021  –.021  .007  .004 
  (.023)  (.025)  (.027)  (.028)  (.034)  (.034) 
Married  –.242  –.326  –.424  –.429  –.099  –.127 
  (.052)  (.058)  (.089)  (.089)  (.086)  (.087) 
Married*female  .178  .136  –.213  –.216  –.030  –.046 
  (.080)  (.087)  (.113)  (.113)  (.120)  (.120) 
Sweden      Ref.  Ref.     
Nordic          Ref.  Ref.  
W Europe          –.161  –.213 
          (.066)  (.073) 
E Europe  Ref.  Ref.  –.762  6.929  –.991  5.994 
      (.394)  (.531)  (.450)  (.579) 
Africa  .485  .524  –.277  7.453  –.506  6.518 
  (.070)  (.077)  (.393)  (.530)  (.449)  (.578) 
Middle East  .647  .614  –.115  7.543  –.344  6.608 
  (.052)  (.057)  (.392)  (.530)  (.448)  (.577) 
Asia  .031  –.037  –.731  6.892  –.302  –.305 
  (.075)  (.082)  (.396)  (.531)  (.344)  (.347) 
North America          .013  –.009 
          (.114)  (.117) 
South America  –.055  –.188  –.818  6.741  –1.046  5.806 
  (.065)  (.070)  (.396)  (.529)  (.451)  (.577) 
Oceania          –.260  –.303 
          (.247)  (.249) 
Et/pop*103     –.021    –.021    –.003 
    (.004)    (.004)    (.001) 
Im/pop*102    –.013    .052    .028 
    (.006)    (.008)    (.010) 
ln (mun 
population)    –.718    –.095    –.145 
    (.020)    (.024)    (.024) 
Mun unempl.    .080    –.086    –.083 
    (.021)    (.022)    (.025) 




Table A4 continued. 
Im*Female      –.616  –.623  –.292  –.315 
      (.087)  (.092)  (.094)  (.098) 
Im*Age      .089  .060  .071  .039 
      (.025)  (.026)  (.028)  (.029) 
Im*Age squared      –.079  –.037  –.107  –.061 
      (.036)  (.037)  (.041)  (.042) 
Im*Married      .181  .103  –.143  –.199 
      (.103)  (.106)  (.101)  (.104) 
Im*Married*fem      .391  .352  .208  .182 
      (.139)  (.143)  (.144)  (.149) 
Im*Asia          –.658  6.262 
          (.575)  (.685) 
Im*Im/pop*102        –.065    –.041 
        (.010)    (.012) 
Im*ln (mun 
population)        –.623    –.573 
        (.031)    (.031) 
Im*Mun unempl.        .166    .163 
        (.030)    (.033) 
Im*Et/pop*103            –.018 
            (.004) 
Constant  –1.060  7.697  –.298  .768  –.069  1.703 
  (.258)  (.360)  (.299)  (.390)  (.369)  (.453) 
# individuals  13,174  13,174  28,154  28,154  19,641  19,641 
Pseudo R-squared  .04  .16  .12  .19  .03  .12 
Notes: Parameter estimates from logit specifications for leaving the initial municipality within four years, 
standard errors in parentheses. Municipal variables described above in the appendix. “Im” is a dummy for 
refugee immigrants. (1) Pre-post, ind; (2) Pre-post, ind + mun; (3) Diff-in-diff, natives, ind; (4) Diff-in-diff, 




Table A5 : Relocation from labor market region, full estimation results for Table 4. 
     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Im cohort 87/89  .268  –.232  .442  .168 
  (.085)  (.090)  (.094)  (.103) 
87/89  .061  .069  –.113  –.364 
  (.064)  (.066)  (.076)  (.083) 
Female  .249  .313  –.206  –.215 
  (.075)  (.078)  (.090)  (.097) 
Age  –.040  –.032  –.023  –.004 
  (.024)  (.024)  (.029)  (.031) 
Age squared*10–2  –.026  –.042  .016  –.014 
  (.035)  (.036)  (.043)  (.046) 
Married  –.342  –.374  .005  –.220 
  (.115)  (.117)  (.107)  (.115) 
Married*female  –.207  –.268  .019  .023 
  (.144)  (.147)  (.151)  (.162) 
Sweden  Ref.  Ref.     
Nordic      Ref.  Ref. 
W Europe      –.160  .318 
      (.085)  (.093) 
E Europe  –1.210  –.041  –1.099  –.097 
  (.472)  (.497)  (.547)  (.595) 
Africa  –.541  .639  –.431  .588 
  (.470)  (.495)  (.546)  (.593) 
Middle East  –.303  .824  –.193  .771 
  (.468)  (.494)  (.544)  (.592) 
Asia  –1.057  .001  –.686  .497 
  (.473)  (.499)  (.524)  (.552) 
North America      .277  .820 
      (.133)  (.146) 
South America  –1.319  –.092  –1.209  –.148 
  (.473)  (.499)  (.549)  (.597) 
Oceania      –.262  .073 
      (.325)  (.347) 
Im*Female  –.743  –.704  –.288  –.175 
  (.103)  (.110)  (.115)  (.125) 
Im*Age  .098  .070  .081  .041 
  (.030)  (.031)  (.034)  (.037) 
Im*Age squared  –.088  –.042  –.129  –.069 
  (.044)  (.046)  (.050)  (.054) 
Im*Married  .136  .149  –.212  –.009 
  (.128)  (.133)  (.121)  (.132) 
Im*Married*fem  .485  .429  .258  .135 
  (.169)  (.177)  (.176)  (.190) 




Table A5 continued. 
ln (lmr population)    1.103    1.632 
    (.191)    (.198) 
ln (lmr pop) squared    –.074    –.098 
    (.008)    (.008) 
Im*Asia      –.260  –.555 
      (.768)  (.819) 
Constant  –.950  –3.611  –1.061  –6.401 
  (.375)  (1.194)  (.467)  (1.264) 
# individuals  28,154  28,154  19,641  19,641 
Pseudo R-squared  .13  .25  .06  .22 
Notes: Parameter estimates from logit specifications for leaving the initial labor market region within four 
years, standard errors in parentheses. “Im” is a dummy for refugee immigrants. (1) Diff-in-diff, natives, ind; 




Table A6 : Decision to relocate, municipal variables by region of origin. 
   
Et/pop (Eastern Europe)  –.062 
  (.013) 
Africa* Et/pop  .113 
  (.070) 
Middle East* Et/pop  .050 
  (.016) 
Asia* Et/pop  –.187 
  (.118) 
South America* Et/pop  –.001 
  (.031) 
Im/pop (Eastern Europe)  –.001 
  (.028) 
Africa* Im/pop  –.072 
  (.039) 
Middle East* Im/pop  –.045 
  (.039) 
Asia* Im/pop  –.001 
  (.030) 
South America* Im/pop  .044 
  (.035) 
ln (mun pop) (Eastern Europe)  –.426 
  (.101) 
Africa* ln (mun pop)  –.223 
  (.074) 
Middle East* ln (mun pop)  –.548 
  (.093) 
Asia* ln (mun pop)  .071 
  (.076) 
South America* ln (mun pop)  –.131 
  (.084) 
Mun unempl (Eastern Europe)  –.191 
  (.105) 
Africa* Mun unempl  .181 
  (.148) 
Middle East* Mun unempl  .528 
  (.108) 
Asia* Mun unempl  .052 
  (.142) 
South America* Mun unempl  .309 
  (.120) 
Female  –.345 
  (.082) 
Age  –.017 
  (.019) 
Age squared*10–2  –.011 
  (.027) 




Table A6 continued. 
Married  –.281 
  (.065) 
Married*female  .050 
  (.105) 
Reg. of orig. (Eastern Europe ref.)   
Africa  2.717 
  (.823) 
Middle East  5.699 
  (.943) 
Asia  –1.173 
  (.791) 
South America  .357 
  (.842) 
# individuals  10,456 
Pseudo R-squared  .19 
Notes: Parameter estimates from logit specifications for leaving the initial municipality within four years, 




Table A7 : Natives’ and OECD migrants’ location choices. 
  Natives  OECD migrants 
(Et/pop )*103    .025 
    (.001) 
(Im/pop)*102  –.018  .013 
  (.015)  (.014) 
ln (regional population)  .964  .872 
  (.051)  (.046) 
Regional unemployment  –.031  –.287 
  (.050)  (.053) 
ln (mean earnings)  2.728  1.966 
  (.448)  (.457) 
Immigrant employment    .960 
    (.869) 
SA takers  .048  .114 
  (.053)  (.049) 
SA take-up rate  –.015  –.013 
  (.005)  (.005) 
Municipal tax rate  –.006  .006 
  (.013)  (.012) 
ln (per capita mun spending)  –.459  –.164 
  (.332)  (.322) 
Fraction in resident-owned home  –.005  –.009 
  (.003)  (.003) 
# individuals  1,005  1,166 
Pseudo R-squared  .12  .16 
Notes: Estimates from conditional logit models for choice of municipality, 279 alternatives. Regional 




Table A8 : Variations on individual characteristics in choice of municipality. 
  Males  Females  Low education  High education 
(Et/pop )*103  .080  .075  .068  .112 
  (.006)  (.007)  (.005)  (.009) 
(Im/pop)*102  .063  .057  .066  .052 
  (.008)  (.011)  (.007)  (.013) 
ln (regional population)  1.124  1.076  1.082  1.169 
  (.034)  (.044)  (.032)  (.052) 
Regional unemployment  –.073  –.214  –.127  –.103 
  (.041)  (.058)  (.039)  (.067) 
ln (mean earnings)  .502  .847  –.162  2.708 
  (.409)  (.504)  (.378)  (.587) 
Immigrant employment  .025  .011  .027  .003 
  (.007)  (.009)  (.007)  (.012) 
SA takers  .119  .165  .118  .167 
  (.035)  (.044)  (.032)  (.054) 
SA take-up rate  –.001  .008  .003  .003 
  (.004)  (.005)  (.004)  (.007) 
Municipal tax rate  .021  .030  .024  .028 
  (.007)  (.010)  (.007)  (.011) 
ln (per capita mun spending)  .072  –.167  .011  –.187 
  (.247)  (.312)  (.227)  (.372) 
Fraction in resident-owned home  –.005  .000  –.005  .002 
  (.002)  (.003)  (.002)  (.003) 
# individuals  2,462  1,466  2,809  1,119 
Pseudo R-squared  .28  .26  .26  .32 
Notes: Estimates from conditional logit models for program participants’ (87/89 immigrants) choice of 
municipality, 279 alternatives. Regional variables described above in the appendix. “High education” means 
at least some post-high school education (more than 12 years of schooling) eight years after arrival. 
 
 
Table A9 : Choice of labor market region / county. 
  Labor market regions  Counties 
(Et/pop )*103  .128  .142 
  (.009)  (.011) 
(Im/pop)*102  .031  .080 
  (.011)  (.018) 
ln (regional population)  1.246  1.233 
  (.023)  (.058) 
Regional unemployment  –.028  .013 
  (.033)  (.035) 
# individuals  3,928  3,928 
Pseudo R-squared  .39  .23 
Notes: Estimates from conditional logit models. The labor market region (county) specification contains 111 
(24) alternatives for each individual. Regional variables described above in the appendix. Note that the 
estimations include all individuals who changed municipality; i.e. also those who remained in the same 
labor market region (county). 
 